Pwned password database download torrent

This is heaps for legitimate web-based use cases. One quick caveat on the search feature: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence or in other words, just because a password doesn't return a hit doesn't mean it hasn't been previously exposed.

For example, the password I used on Dropbox is out there as a bcrypt hash and given it's a randomly generated string out of 1Password, it's simply not getting cracked. I say this because some people will inevitably say "I was in the XX breach and used YY password but your service doesn't say it was pwned".

Now you know why! So that's the online option but again, don't use this for anything important in terms of actual passwords, there's a much better way.

The entire collection of million hashed passwords can be directly downloaded from the Pwned Passwords page. It's a single 7-Zip file that's 5. This allows you to use the passwords in whatever fashion you see fit and I'll give you a few sample scenarios in a moment.

Providing data in this fashion wasn't easy, primarily due to the size of the zip file. Actually, let me rephrase that: it wouldn't be easy if I wanted to do it without spending a heap for other people to download the data!

I asked for some advice on this whilst preparing the service:. What's a cheap way of hosting a 6GB file for a heap of people to download? There were lots of well-intentioned suggestions which wouldn't fly. For example, Dropbox and OneDrive aren't intended for sharing files with a large audience and they'll pull your ability to do so if you try believe me.

Hosting models which require me to administer a server are also out as that's a bunch of other responsibility I'm unwilling to take on.

Lots of people pointed to file hosting models where the storage was cheap but then the bandwidth stung so those were out too. Backblaze's B2 was the most cost effective but at 2c a GB for downloads, I could easily see myself paying north of a thousand dollars over time. Amazon has got a neat Requestor Pays Feature but as soon as there's a cost - any cost - there's a barrier to entry.

In fact, both this model and torrenting it were out because they make access to data harder; many organisations block torrents for obvious reasons and I know, for example, that either of these options would have posed insurmountable hurdles at my previous employment. Actually, I probably would have ended up just paying for it myself due to the procurement challenges of even a single-digit dollar amount, but let's not get me started on that!

Edit: Based on popular demand and a very well-articulated comment below , I've now added torrent links to the Pwned Passwords page as well. After that tweet, I got several offers of support which was awesome given it wasn't even clear what I was doing! One of those offers came from Cloudflare who I've written about many times before. I'm a big supporter of what they do for all the sorts of reasons mentioned in those posts, plus their offer of support would mean the data would be aggressively cached in their edge nodes around the world.

What this means over and above simple hosting of the files itself is that downloads should be super fast for everyone because it's always being served from somewhere very close to them. The source file actually sits in Azure blob storage but regardless of how many times you guys download it, I'll only see a few requests a month at most. So big thanks to Cloudflare for not just making this possible in the first place, but for making it a better experience for everyone.

Sometimes passwords are personally identifiable. Either they contain personal info such as kids' names and birthdays or they can even be email addresses. One of the most common password hints in the Adobe data breach remember, they leaked hints in clear text , was "email" so you see the challenge here. Further to that, if I did provide all the passwords in clear text fashion then it opens up the risk of them being used as a source to potentially brute force accounts.

Yes, some people will be able to sniff out the sources of a large number of them in plain text if they really want to, but as with my views on protecting data breaches themselves, I don't want to be the channel by which this data is spread further in a way that can do harm. I'm hashing them out of "an abundance of caution" and besides, for the use cases I'm going to talk about shortly, they don't need to be in plain text format anyway.

Each of the million passwords is being provided as a SHA1 hash. What this means is that anyone using this data can take a plain text password from their end for example during registration, password change or at login , hash it with SHA1 and see if it's previously been leaked. It doesn't matter that SHA1 is a fast algorithm unsuitable for storing your customers' passwords with because that's not what we're doing here, it's simply about ensuring the source passwords are not immediately visible.

If you're comparing these to hashes on your end, make sure you either generate your hashes in uppercase or do a case insensitive comparison. Let's go through a few different use cases of how I'm hoping this data can be employed to do good things. At the point of registration, the user-provided password can be checked against the Pwned Passwords list.

Generally speaking, it is best to assume that any password that is listed in the database is known to attackers and should not be used anymore. However, I am grateful that this website exists to check my email for pwnage.

So thanks for that. If you are strict about never reusing passwords, then this service is of limited value. So my recommendation is: generate a new and completely random password for each site and service you use. Entering your password in a site like this puts your password in a list that potentially could be used for brute force attacks. Hackers are so resourceful. Instead of creating their own lists, they masquerade as a password checking facility, and get everyone else to add words to their list.

This password has been seen 24 times before. Still, interesting.. I quote:. That was from the above post and was referencing version 1. However he comments further on this and partially justifies why he is doing this:.

Seeing either your email address or your password pwned has a way of making people reconsider some of their security decisions. Who, me? I don't provide a usual name for my favorite pet or mom's name but instead another 32chrs. Password managers nowadays are legion and the only effort is in finding the best suitable for our expectations. Concerning the online Pwned Passwords checking I wouldn't check online a password I use, but I could test new ones, just to see.

After all there's only the user who knows if the password he's checking in elaborated from imagination or factual. The python script is not so polished, but it works fast and for lists of passwords too. PS: Thanks Martin for the article. Now I can demonstrate to my wife how bad she is at inventing passwords :. These instructions assume that you drive a mac but should be as straightforward on linux. The mongoimport command assumes that your mongod server is listing locally on the default port.

If not you can pass commandline args to mongoimport below to connect to a remote server. That means that to query by the pk you need to do a little bit of work to conver the string base64 SHA1 into a BinData type.

You should test your query solution against known passwords such as P ssword so that you don't get false negatives. Skip to content. Sign in Sign up. Instantly share code, notes, and snippets. The only difference and this shouldn't break any existing usages , is that the response now also contains a count in the body by way of a single integer:. But, of course, we've just had the anonymity chat and you would have seen the path for calling that endpoint earlier on.

Just to point it out again here, you can pass the first 5 chars of the hash to this address:. Unlike the original version, there's no rate-limiting. That was a construct I needed primarily to protect personal data in the breached account search i. Now running on serverless Azure Functions, I don't have that concern so I've dropped it altogether.

I'd also dropped version numbers, I'll deal with that when I need them which may not be for a long time if ever. Now, a few more things around some design decisions I've made: I'm very wary of the potential impact on my wallet of running the service this way.

It's one thing to stand up V1 that only returned an HTTP response code, was rate-limited and really wasn't designed to be called in bulk by a single consumer considering the privacy implications , it's quite another to do what I've done with V2, especially when each search of the range API returns hundreds of records. That "P ssw0rd" search, for example, returns 9, bytes when gzipped that's a pretty average size and I'm paying for egress bandwidth out of Azure, the execution of the function and the call to the underlying storage.

Tiny amounts each time, mind you, but I've had to reduce that impact on me as far as possible through a range of measures. For example, the result of that range query is not a neatly formatted piece of JSON, it's just colon delimited rows. That impacts my ability to add attributes at a later date and pretty much locks in the current version to today's behaviour, but it saves on the response size.

Yes, I know some curly braces and quotes wouldn't add a lot of size, but every byte counts when volumes get large. This is 31 days' worth of cache and the subsequent Cloudflare cache status header explains why: by routing through their infrastructure, they can aggressively cache these results which ensures not only is the response lightning fast remember, they presently have edge nodes around the world so there's one near you , but that I don't wear the financial hit of people hammering my origin.

Especially when you consider the extent to which multiple people use the same password, when we're talking about the range search where many different passwords have identical hash prefixes, there's some significant benefits to be had from caching. The performance difference alone when comparing a cached result with a non-cached one makes a compelling argument:. This means that even though the response is significantly larger than in V1, if I can serve a request to the new API from cache there's actually a massive improvement.

Here's a series of hits to V1 where every single time, the request had to go all the way to the origin server, hit the API and then query M records:. Now, some people will lose their minds over this because they'll say "that means it goes into logs and you'll track the passwords being searched for". If you're worried about me tracking anything, don't use the service. That's not intended to be a flippant statement, rather a simple acknowledgment that you need to trust the operator of the service if you're going to be sending passwords in any shape or form.

Offsetting that is the whole k-Anonymity situation; even if you don't trust the service or you think logs may be leaked and abused and incidentally, nothing is explicitly logged, they're transient system logs at most , the range search goes a very long way to protecting the source. If you still don't trust it, then just download the hashes and host them yourself. No really, that's the whole point of making them available and in all honesty, if it was me building on top of these hashes then I'd definitely be querying my own repository of them.

In summary, if you're using the range search then you get protection of the source password well in excess of what I was able to do in V1 plus it's massively faster if anyone else has done a search for any password that hashes down to the same first 5 characters of SHA Plus, it helps me out an awful lot in terms of keeping the costs down! Lastly, I want to call out a number of examples of the first generation of Pwned Passwords in action. My hope is that they inspire others to build on top of this data set and ultimately, make a positive difference to web security for everyone.

For example, Workbooks. Then there's Colloq they help you discover conferences who've written up a great piece with loads of performance stats about their implementation of the data.

Or try creating an account on Toepoke with a password of "P ssw0rd" and see how that goes for you:. Nothing gains traction like free things!

Keeping HIBP free to search your address or your entire domain was the best thing I ever did in terms of making it stick. A few months after I launched the service, I stood up a donations page where you could buy me some beers or coffee or other things. It only went up after people specifically asked for it "hey awesome service, can I get you a coffee? As I say on the page, it's more the time commitment that really costs me I'm independent so while I'm building something like Pwned Passwords, I'm not doing something else , but there are also costs that may surprise you:.

It was going to be hard to get it live next week otherwise? This is one of those true "Australianisms" courtesy of the fact my up-speed maxes out at about 1. Down-speed is about but getting anything up is a nightmare.

And for Aussie friends, no, there's no NBN available in my area of the Gold Coast yet, but apparently it's not far off. And no, this is not a solvable problem by doing everything in the cloud and there are many reasons why that wouldn't have worked I'll blog them at a later date.

If you want to help kick in for these costs and shout me a sympathy coffee or beer s , it's still very much appreciated! Pwned Passwords V2 is now live! All those models are free, unrestricted and don't even require attribution if you don't want to provide it, just take what's there and go do good things with it?

I often run private workshops around these, here's upcoming events I'll be at:. Don't have Pluralsight already? How about a 10 day free trial?